detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory
Enables your agent to detect attacks that steal Active Directory passwords by abusing replication permissions.
What it does
This system detects attempts to steal Active Directory passwords. It looks for suspicious activity that mimics how domain controllers (servers managing AD) communicate to replicate information, but originates from unauthorized sources.
When to use it
- ✓When you suspect someone tried to steal passwords.
- ✓After an attack that might have compromised important accounts.
- ✓When investigating unusual network activity.
Example of what to ask your AI
“Check for Active Directory password theft attempts.”
Want more? Open the sections below.
How to use
The easiest way: copy the message below and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any AI. It reads the skill and follows the instructions.
Skill link
Ready-to-paste message
How it works
It monitors specific events that occur when accounts try to access Active Directory replication data. If an account that is not a domain controller attempts this, an alert is generated.
Installation
Easiest way: copy the skill link and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT or Cursor asking it to follow the instructions.
In the terminal (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor), in your project folder:
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directoryOr download just the file:
curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/main/skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.md -o SKILL.mdTechnical content (original SKILL.md)
Original text by the author, straight from GitHub.
Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory
When to Use
- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments
- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions
- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump
- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials
- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening
Prerequisites
- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled
- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled
- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM
- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs
- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object
Workflow
- Identify Legitimate Replication Sources: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.
- Enable Required Auditing: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.
- Monitor Replication Rights Access: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).
- Detect Non-DC Replication Requests: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.
- Correlate with Network Traffic: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR/RPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.
- Investigate Source Context: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.
- Check for Credential Abuse: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |
| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |
| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |
| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |
| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |
| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |
| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |
| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |
| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |
| Splunk / Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |
| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662
index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
| where Properties IN ("*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, ".*\\$$")
| where NOT SubjectUserName IN ("known_svc_account1", "known_svc_account2")
| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer
| where count > 0
| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights
KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where Properties has "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
or Properties has "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
| where SubjectUserName !endswith "$"
| where SubjectUserName !in ("AzureADConnect", "MSOL_*")
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity
title: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
Properties|contains:
- '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
…
FAQ
What is DCSync?
DCSync is a technique used by attackers to extract Active Directory passwords by pretending to be a domain controller to replicate data.
Why is detecting this important?
Detecting DCSync helps prevent credential theft that can lead to full control of your network environment.
What tools can be used for this?
Tools like Mimikatz and Impacket are commonly used by attackers to perform DCSync attacks.
Details
Original description by the author
Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement
Popularity
- GitHub stars
- 35k
- Ranking position
- #5656
- License
- Apache-2.0
- Updated
- 8/31/2026
Comments
- …
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