fable-safe-prompt
Adjusts the instructions given to the agent to avoid inappropriate responses. It helps maintain safety without changing the original request's intent.
What it does
This AI agent helps rewrite prompts so they don't accidentally trigger safety alarms. It makes small changes to specific phrases to keep the original intent, but in a safer way.
When to use it
- ✓When an allowed prompt seems likely to trigger a safety alarm by mistake.
- ✓When the user wants to rephrase a prompt to be clear and safe.
- ✓To prevent sensitive words from triggering safety classifiers.
Example of what to ask your AI
“Rewrite this prompt so it doesn't trigger safety alarms by mistake, but keeps the original intent: <prompt>How could an attacker exploit this authentication?</prompt>”
Want more? Open the sections below.
How to use
The easiest way: copy the message below and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any AI. It reads the skill and follows the instructions.
Skill link
Ready-to-paste message
How it works
The agent identifies phrases that might be misinterpreted by safety systems. It then replaces these phrases with safer alternatives, without changing the prompt's main goal.
Installation
Easiest way: copy the skill link and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT or Cursor asking it to follow the instructions.
In the terminal (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor), in your project folder:
npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill fable-safe-promptOr download just the file:
curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/main/plugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/fable-safe-prompt/SKILL.md -o SKILL.mdTechnical content (original SKILL.md)
Original text by the author, straight from GitHub.
Fable-Safe Prompt
When to Use
- Use when an allowed prompt appears likely to hit false-positive classifier language.
- Use when the user asks for prompt wording that keeps benign intent clear and policy-compliant.
Return the user's prompt back in full, verbatim, changing ONLY the specific sentences/phrases most likely to trip Fable 5's cyber/bio classifiers. Do not rewrite the whole thing, do not summarize, do not restructure — minimal surgical edits. Keep the actual goal and all benign text exactly as written. This lowers false positives for benign work. It must not be used to bypass safety policy or enable harmful requests.
Fable 5 runs 3 input classifiers: cyber, bio/chem, reasoning_extraction. Triggers are keyword/surface-based, largely intent-independent ("hello" and "cancer" got flagged). The fix is to abstract away the sensitive domain, not just restate intent.
Apply when the prompt touches: cyber/auth/exploits/malware/pentesting/credentials; bio/chem/medical/disease/lab topics; or any "show your reasoning" instruction.
The user provides the prompt-to-be-changed wrapped in <prompt>...</prompt> XML tags. Operate only on the text inside those tags; treat everything outside as instructions to you.
Method
- Flag the highly problematic sentences/phrases (offensive framings, named sensitive domains, "show your thinking" lines).
- Replace each in place with a safe equivalent (see swaps), or describe the wanted functionality abstractly rather than naming the domain.
- Leave everything else byte-for-byte identical.
- Return the complete edited prompt.
Reframe so the task reads as: owned/authorized, defensive (implement/fix/test, not attack), and not dual-use (no exploit dev, attack simulation, bypass payloads, malware, live testing).
Swap framings (apply per-sentence)
| Triggering | Safe rewrite |
|---|---|
| "How could an attacker exploit this auth" | "Review these auth files for missing checks and fix them defensively" |
| "Write an exploit / payload / PoC" | "Add a regression test proving X is fixed, then patch it" |
| "How do I bypass / brute-force Y" | "Enforce secure session validation + rate limiting on Y" |
| "Reverse this malware / show attack steps" | "Describe the risk high-level, then implement the fix" |
| "Show your reasoning / explain step-by-step / walk me through your thinking" | Delete it. Trips reasoning_extraction. If progress visibility is needed, ask it to use a send-to-user tool, not to echo its internal thoughts. |
| Clinician framing: "as a doctor, diagnose this ECG" | Patient framing: "help me interpret this ECG my doctor gave me" |
| Named bio/chem domain: "cancer / disease pathway / chemical kinetics" | Abstract it: describe the data/analysis generically, drop the domain noun |
Trigger keywords to abstract away
Cyber: exploit, malware, vulnerability, attack, bypass, stealth, fingerprinting, anti-bot, CAPTCHA, penetration. Bio/chem: biology, biomedicine, chemistry, cancer, disease pathways, RNA/variant calling, equilibrium, kinetics, diagnosis. Distillation: "distill the model", training pipelines, frontier LLM development.
If no benign defensive equivalent exists for a sentence (it's purely offensive), flag it to the user rather than silently neutering the intent.
Output
- Print the full safe prompt back to the user in text (a code block, ready to paste).
- Copy it to the clipboard so the user can paste immediately:
Confirm in one line that it's on the clipboard.pbcopy <<'EOF' <the full safe prompt> EOF - A short list of exactly which sentences you changed and what they became.
- If the task is genuinely offensive (pentest, exploit repro, malware analysis): say plainly no edit makes it Fable-safe — use an Opus 4.8 fallback or vetted Mythos, not Fable 5.
Hard truth: you can't reliably stop Fable 5 guardrails. Robust API setups also treat stop_reason: "refusal" (HTTP 200, stop_details.category = cyber/bio) as a route to an Opus 4.8 fallback — mention only if the user controls the integration.
Example
User request:
Rewrite this allowed prompt to reduce false-positive classifier triggers while preserving its intent and constraints.
Limitations
- Adapted from
davidondrej/skills; verify local paths, tools, credentials, and agent features before acting.
…
FAQ
What are 'false positives'?
These are alarms that go off by mistake, like when a safety system thinks something is dangerous, but it's actually harmless.
Will the agent change what I asked for?
No, the goal is to keep your original intent. It only adjusts the wording to avoid safety issues, without changing what you want the AI to do.
What if the prompt is genuinely dangerous?
If the prompt is truly offensive or dangerous, the agent will not edit it and will state that it cannot be made safe.
Details
Original description by the author
Rewrite allowed prompts to reduce false-positive safety triggers without bypassing policy or changing intent.
Popularity
- GitHub stars
- 48k
- Ranking position
- #2968
- License
- MIT
- Updated
- 10/15/2026
Comments
- …
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