GitHub Actions Hardening

A focused security reviewer for GitHub Actions workflows. It reasons about the Actions-specific threat model — where trust boundaries live in trigger types, token scopes, and string interpolation — rather than the application-code vulnerabilities a general security scanner looks for. Most workflow risks are invisible to language linters because the dangerous code is the YAML itself and the way GitHub expands ${{ }} expressions into a shell before your script runs.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when the request involves:

• Reviewing, auditing, or hardening any file under .github/workflows/
• Authoring a new workflow and wanting it secure by default
• A workflow that uses pull_request_target, workflow_run, or issue_comment triggers
• Questions about GITHUB_TOKEN permissions or the permissions: key
• Pinning actions to commit SHAs vs tags vs branches
• Handling untrusted input (issue titles, PR bodies, branch names, commit messages) in run: steps
• OIDC / cloud authentication from Actions, or secret handling in CI
• Self-hosted runners on public repositories
• Any request like "is this workflow safe?", "secure my CI", or "review this GitHub Action"

The Core Insight

In a workflow, ${{ <expr> }} is expanded by the runner into the script before the shell executes it. So a step like:

- run: echo "Title: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}"

is not passing a variable — it is pasting attacker-controlled text directly into your shell command. An issue titled "; <attacker-command> # is concatenated into the script and executed. This single mechanism is the most common real-world Actions vulnerability, and models routinely generate it. Treat every ${{ }} that contains data an outside contributor can influence as a code-injection sink.

Execution Workflow

Follow these steps in order for every workflow reviewed.

Step 1 — Map the Triggers and Trust Level

Read every on: trigger and classify the workflow's privilege:

• push, pull_request (from same repo) → runs with the contributor's own trust
• pull_request from a fork → runs with a read-only token, no secrets (safe by design)
• pull_request_target, workflow_run, issue_comment, issues → run in the context of the base repository with a read/write token and full access to secrets, but can be triggered by outside contributors. These are the dangerous triggers.

Read references/triggers-and-privilege.md for the full trust matrix.

Step 2 — Hunt for Script Injection

For every run: block, every script: in actions/github-script, and every input to a custom action, list the ${{ }} expressions and check whether any resolve to attacker-controllable data. High-risk contexts include:

• github.event.issue.title, github.event.issue.body
• github.event.pull_request.title, github.event.pull_request.body, .head.ref, .head.label
• github.event.comment.body, github.event.review.body
• github.event.pages.*.page_name, github.event.commits.*.message, github.event.head_commit.*
• github.head_ref and any github.event.* field a fork author can set

Read references/injection.md for the complete sink list and the safe-pattern fixes.

Step 3 — Check Privileged Triggers Don't Execute Untrusted Code

If a pull_request_target or workflow_run workflow checks out PR/fork code (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}) and then runs it (build, test, install scripts, npm install with lifecycle scripts, etc.), that is remote code execution against a privileged token. Flag it as CRITICAL. The safe pattern is to split into two workflows: an unprivileged pull_request workflow that runs the untrusted code, and a privileged workflow_run workflow that only consumes its results.

Step 4 — Audit permissions:

• If there is no permissions: block, the workflow inherits the repository default, which may be read/write to everything. Flag it.
• Recommend a top-level permissions: {} (deny-all) or contents: read, then grant the minimum per job (e.g. pull-requests: write only on the job that comments).
• Flag any permissions: write-all or broad write scopes that the steps don't actually need.

Read references/permissions-and-tokens.md for the per-scope guidance and OIDC setup.

Step 5 — Audit Action References (Supply Chain)

For every uses::

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