implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts
Teaches your AI agent to ship projects and manage infrastructure.
What it does
This tool adds a "digital signature" to your program files. This ensures the files haven't been tampered with and come from a trusted source, like a seal of authenticity.
When to use it
- ✓When you want to ensure a program file hasn't been modified by hackers.
- ✓When you need to prove to your customers that the software is genuinely yours and hasn't been tampered with.
- ✓When you want your system to automatically reject any program that lacks this official "signature".
Example of what to ask your AI
“Digitally sign my program files to ensure they haven't been tampered with.”
Want more? Open the sections below.
How to use
The easiest way: copy the message below and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any AI. It reads the skill and follows the instructions.
Skill link
Ready-to-paste message
How it works
The tool uses cryptographic methods (like GPG or Sigstore) to create a unique signature for each file. This signature is later verified to confirm the file's integrity and origin.
Installation
Easiest way: copy the skill link and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT or Cursor asking it to follow the instructions.
In the terminal (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor), in your project folder:
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-code-signing-for-artifactsOr download just the file:
curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/main/skills/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts/SKILL.md -o SKILL.mdTechnical content (original SKILL.md)
Original text by the author, straight from GitHub.
Implementing Code Signing for Artifacts
When to Use
- When establishing artifact integrity verification to prevent supply chain tampering
- When compliance requires cryptographic proof that build artifacts are authentic and unmodified
- When distributing software to customers who need to verify publisher identity
- When implementing zero-trust deployment pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts
- When meeting SLSA Level 2+ requirements for provenance and integrity
Do not use for encrypting artifacts (signing provides integrity, not confidentiality), for container image signing specifically (use cosign), or for source code authentication (use commit signing).
Prerequisites
- GPG key pair for traditional signing or Sigstore account for keyless signing
- Code signing certificate from a Certificate Authority for public distribution
- CI/CD pipeline with access to signing keys or identity provider
- Verification infrastructure in deployment pipelines
Workflow
Step 1: Generate and Manage Signing Keys
# Generate GPG key for artifact signing
gpg --full-generate-key --batch <<EOF
Key-Type: eddsa
Key-Curve: ed25519
Subkey-Type: eddsa
Subkey-Curve: ed25519
Name-Real: CI Build System
Name-Email: ci-signing@company.com
Expire-Date: 1y
%no-protection
EOF
# Export public key for distribution
gpg --armor --export ci-signing@company.com > signing-key.pub
# Export private key for CI/CD (store in secrets manager)
gpg --armor --export-secret-keys ci-signing@company.com > signing-key.priv
Step 2: Sign Build Artifacts in CI/CD
# .github/workflows/build-sign.yml
name: Build and Sign
on:
push:
tags: ['v*']
jobs:
build-sign:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write # For Sigstore keyless signing
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Build artifacts
run: |
make build
sha256sum dist/* > dist/checksums.sha256
- name: Import GPG Key
run: |
echo "${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}" | gpg --batch --import
gpg --list-secret-keys
- name: Sign artifacts
run: |
for file in dist/*; do
gpg --detach-sign --armor --local-user ci-signing@company.com "$file"
done
- name: Install cosign for keyless signing
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
- name: Keyless sign with Sigstore
run: |
for file in dist/*.tar.gz; do
cosign sign-blob "$file" \
--output-signature "${file}.sig" \
--output-certificate "${file}.cert" \
--yes
done
- name: Create Release with signed artifacts
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
files: |
dist/*
dist/*.asc
dist/*.sig
dist/*.cert
Step 3: Verify Signatures in Deployment Pipeline
# Verify GPG signature
gpg --import signing-key.pub
gpg --verify artifact.tar.gz.asc artifact.tar.gz
# Verify Sigstore keyless signature
cosign verify-blob artifact.tar.gz \
--signature artifact.tar.gz.sig \
--certificate artifact.tar.gz.cert \
--certificate-identity ci-signing@company.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
# Verify checksums
sha256sum --check checksums.sha256
Step 4: Sign npm Packages with Provenance
{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "npm run build && npm run test"
},
"publishConfig": {
"provenance": true
}
}
# Publish npm package with provenance attestation
npm publish --provenance
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Code Signing | Cryptographic process of signing software artifacts to verify publisher identity and artifact integrity |
| Detached Signature | Signature stored in a separate file from the artifact, allowing independent distribution |
| Keyless Signing | Sigstore's approach using short-lived certificates tied to OIDC identities instead of long-lived keys |
| Provenance | Metadata describing how, where, and by whom an artifact was built |
| Transparency Log | Append-only log (Rekor) that records all signing events for public auditability |
| Trust Chain | Hierarchical chain from root CA to signing certificate establishing trust in the signer's identity |
| SLSA | Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts — framework defining levels of supply chain security |
…
FAQ
What is a digital signature?
It's like a security seal that proves a file is authentic and hasn't been changed since it was signed.
What's the difference between signing and encrypting?
Signing ensures authenticity and integrity (who made it and if it's unchanged). Encrypting protects the content, making it unreadable without a key.
Do I need a special key to sign?
Yes, you need a key pair (public and private) or use a service like Sigstore that manages this for you more simply (keyless).
Details
Original description by the author
Implements code signing for build artifacts (binaries, packages, containers) using GPG, Sigstore, and platform-specific signing tools, establishing trust chains and verifying signatures in deployment pipelines. Use when establishing artifact integrity checks against supply-chain tampering, proving authenticity to customers, building zero-trust pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts, or meeting S
Popularity
- GitHub stars
- 35k
- Ranking position
- #5853
- License
- Apache-2.0
- Updated
- 8/31/2026
Comments
- …
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