cloud-iam-deep
Simulates attacks on cloud systems. It helps find and fix vulnerabilities before they are exploited.
What it does
This tool helps find and explore security weaknesses in cloud environments like AWS, Azure, and GCP. It's used to ethically test security by simulating real attacks to identify vulnerabilities.
When to use it
- ✓When you find exposed cloud credentials (keys, tokens).
- ✓When discovering a path to access sensitive cloud service information.
- ✓After gaining access to a cloud server and wanting to check control over other services.
Example of what to ask your AI
“I found an AWS access key in some code. How can I check if it has dangerous permissions?”
Want more? Open the sections below.
How to use
The easiest way: copy the message below and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any AI. It reads the skill and follows the instructions.
Skill link
Ready-to-paste message
How it works
The tool first identifies potential exposed credentials. Then, it uses specific commands to check the permissions associated with these credentials and tries to find ways to gain more access, always focusing on security.
Installation
Easiest way: copy the skill link and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT or Cursor asking it to follow the instructions.
In the terminal (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor), in your project folder:
npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill cloud-iam-deepOr download just the file:
curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/main/plugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/cloud-iam-deep/SKILL.md -o SKILL.mdTechnical content (original SKILL.md)
Original text by the author, straight from GitHub.
⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
When to use
Trigger when:
- A cloud credential surfaces (key, secret, token, JSON file)
- SSRF chain reaches IMDS / metadata endpoint
- APK / git-leak reveals embedded cloud key
- Recon shows public S3/GCS/Azure-blob with permissions you can verify
- A Kubernetes API or service-account token is exposed
- Post-RCE on a cloud-hosted instance — pivot to cloud control plane
Do NOT use for:
- On-prem-only environments (use AD attack skills — but those are out of scope per external-only boundary)
- Web2 vulns that happen to be on AWS — use the relevant
hunt-*skill
Credential identification (first 60 seconds)
# AWS access key patterns
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM user access key (long-term)
ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16} # STS temporary credential
AGPA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM group
AIDA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM user (user-id)
AROA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM role
ANPA[0-9A-Z]{16} # Managed policy
# AWS secret pattern (40-char base64-ish — context required)
[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40} # AWS secret access key
# Azure
AccountKey=[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{86} # Storage account key
client_secret pattern + UUID # Azure AD app credential
# GCP service account JSON
{
"type": "service_account",
"project_id": "...",
"private_key_id": "...",
"private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----..."
}
# K8s SA token (JWT format — decode to confirm)
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1... # decode kid claim to see issuer
AWS — read-only validation (the safe first step)
# Set credential
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."
# 1. WHO am I?
aws sts get-caller-identity
# Returns: UserId, Account, Arn
# Arn tells you: IAM user vs role, account ID, name
# 2. WHAT can I do? (the privesc question)
# Try common read-only first — failures still inform you
aws iam list-users 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-roles 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-policies 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-groups 2>&1 | head -5
# 3. WHAT policies are attached to me?
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <self>
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name <self> # inline policies
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name <self>
# 4. Service-by-service surface
aws ec2 describe-instances --max-items 1 2>&1 | head
aws s3 ls 2>&1 | head -10
aws lambda list-functions --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws rds describe-db-instances --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws secretsmanager list-secrets --max-results 5 2>&1 | head
aws ssm describe-parameters --max-results 5 2>&1 | head
# 5. Audit any cross-account / external trust
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?contains(AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement[0].Principal.AWS, `arn:aws:iam::`)]' 2>&1 | head -20
AWS privesc patterns (24+ documented — iam_privesc techniques)
Quick lookup — if you have any of these IAM actions, escalate via the listed technique:
| You have | Escalate via |
|---|---|
iam:CreateAccessKey |
Create access key on any user → impersonate |
iam:CreateLoginProfile |
Set a console password on a user → login |
iam:UpdateLoginProfile |
Reset console password on a user |
iam:AttachUserPolicy |
Attach AdministratorAccess to self |
iam:AttachGroupPolicy |
Attach AdministratorAccess to a group you're in |
iam:AttachRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole |
Attach to a role you can assume |
iam:PutUserPolicy |
Inline AdministratorAccess to self |
iam:PutGroupPolicy |
Inline policy on a group |
iam:PutRolePolicy |
Inline on a role you can assume |
iam:AddUserToGroup |
Add self to admin group |
…
FAQ
Can I use this on any cloud?
It's primarily designed for public clouds like AWS, Azure, and GCP, but may not cover all services or specific configurations of each.
Is it safe to use?
This tool should ONLY be used with explicit, written permission from the system owner. Unauthorized use is illegal and prohibited. It's recommended to use it in controlled testing environments.
What does 'red-team attack chain' mean?
It means a sequence of steps that a 'red team' (simulating attackers) would use to exploit security flaws in a cloud system, from initial access to full control.
Details
Original description by the author
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP
Popularity
- GitHub stars
- 48k
- Ranking position
- #2548
- License
- MIT
- Updated
- 10/15/2026
Comments
- …
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