sharp-edges
sharp-edges
What it does
This tool analyzes code, configurations, or interfaces to find places where developers might accidentally make security mistakes. It focuses on design 'footguns' that make the insecure path easier than the secure one.
When to use it
- ✓When reviewing the design of a new API or library.
- ✓When auditing configuration files for dangerous options.
- ✓When evaluating how easy or hard a cryptographic library is to use correctly.
Example of what to ask your AI
“Analyze this API configuration for potential security 'footguns'.”
Want more? Open the sections below.
How to use
The easiest way: copy the message below and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any AI. It reads the skill and follows the instructions.
Skill link
Ready-to-paste message
How it works
It looks for common patterns in APIs and configurations that have historically led to security errors. This includes things like letting developers choose weak algorithms, using insecure defaults, or having options that easily disable security.
Installation
Easiest way: copy the skill link and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT or Cursor asking it to follow the instructions.
In the terminal (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor), in your project folder:
npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill sharp-edgesOr download just the file:
curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/main/plugins/agentic-awesome-skills-claude/skills/sharp-edges/SKILL.md -o SKILL.mdTechnical content (original SKILL.md)
Original text by the author, straight from GitHub.
Bundled upstream support
Supporting files are included at skill-relative paths. See UPSTREAM-NOTICE.md for their pinned sources, licenses, hashes, and import changes.
name: sharp-edges description: "Identifies error-prone APIs, dangerous configurations, and footgun designs that enable security mistakes. Use when reviewing API designs, configuration schemas, cryptographic library ergonomics, or evaluating whether code follows 'secure by...
Sharp Edges Analysis
Evaluates whether APIs, configurations, and interfaces are resistant to developer misuse. Identifies designs where the "easy path" leads to insecurity.
When to Use
- Reviewing API or library design decisions
- Auditing configuration schemas for dangerous options
- Evaluating cryptographic API ergonomics
- Assessing authentication/authorization interfaces
- Reviewing any code that exposes security-relevant choices to developers
When NOT to Use
- Implementation bugs (use standard code review)
- Business logic flaws (use domain-specific analysis)
- Performance optimization (different concern)
Core Principle
The pit of success: Secure usage should be the path of least resistance. If developers must understand cryptography, read documentation carefully, or remember special rules to avoid vulnerabilities, the API has failed.
Rationalizations to Reject
| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
|---|---|---|
| "It's documented" | Developers don't read docs under deadline pressure | Make the secure choice the default or only option |
| "Advanced users need flexibility" | Flexibility creates footguns; most "advanced" usage is copy-paste | Provide safe high-level APIs; hide primitives |
| "It's the developer's responsibility" | Blame-shifting; you designed the footgun | Remove the footgun or make it impossible to misuse |
| "Nobody would actually do that" | Developers do everything imaginable under pressure | Assume maximum developer confusion |
| "It's just a configuration option" | Config is code; wrong configs ship to production | Validate configs; reject dangerous combinations |
| "We need backwards compatibility" | Insecure defaults can't be grandfather-claused | Deprecate loudly; force migration |
Sharp Edge Categories
1. Algorithm/Mode Selection Footguns
APIs that let developers choose algorithms invite choosing wrong ones.
The JWT Pattern (canonical example):
- Header specifies algorithm: attacker can set
"alg": "none"to bypass signatures - Algorithm confusion: RSA public key used as HMAC secret when switching RS256→HS256
- Root cause: Letting untrusted input control security-critical decisions
Detection patterns:
- Function parameters like
algorithm,mode,cipher,hash_type - Enums/strings selecting cryptographic primitives
- Configuration options for security mechanisms
Example - PHP password_hash allowing weak algorithms:
// DANGEROUS: allows crc32, md5, sha1
password_hash($password, PASSWORD_DEFAULT); // Good - no choice
hash($algorithm, $password); // BAD: accepts "crc32"
2. Dangerous Defaults
Defaults that are insecure, or zero/empty values that disable security.
The OTP Lifetime Pattern:
# What happens when lifetime=0?
def verify_otp(code, lifetime=300): # 300 seconds default
if lifetime == 0:
return True # OOPS: 0 means "accept all"?
# Or does it mean "expired immediately"?
Detection patterns:
- Timeouts/lifetimes that accept 0 (infinite? immediate expiry?)
- Empty strings that bypass checks
- Null values that skip validation
- Boolean defaults that disable security features
- Negative values with undefined semantics
Questions to ask:
- What happens with
timeout=0?max_attempts=0?key=""? - Is the default the most secure option?
- Can any default value disable security entirely?
3. Primitive vs. Semantic APIs
APIs that expose raw bytes instead of meaningful types invite type confusion.
The Libsodium vs. Halite Pattern:
// Libsodium (primitives): bytes are bytes
sodium_crypto_box($message, $nonce, $keypair);
// Easy to: swap nonce/keypair, reuse nonces, use wrong key type
// Halite (semantic): types enforce correct usage
Crypto::seal($message, new EncryptionPublicKey($key));
// Wrong key type = type error, not silent failure
Detection patterns:
…
FAQ
What is a 'security footgun'?
It's a design feature that seems useful but can be easily misused in a way that causes a security problem, often without the user realizing it.
Why isn't documentation enough?
Because under pressure, developers often don't read full documentation. The tool focuses on making the secure way the easy way, rather than relying solely on reading docs.
Does this find all security bugs?
No, this tool focuses on design issues that lead to security mistakes. It doesn't find implementation bugs (like typos) or flaws in business logic.
Details
Popularity
- GitHub stars
- 48k
- Ranking position
- #4158
- License
- MIT
- Updated
- 10/15/2026
Comments
- …
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